Higher education subsidies are primarily distributed through need-based programs, without differentiating by college major. However, labor market outcomes vary significantly across majors. Science and Engineering graduates tend to earn the highest wage premiums and face the lowest unemployment rates, while there is a strong prior pattern of ability selection into these majors. I study the aggregate effects of higher education subsidies, taking into account key differences across college graduates by major. These differences include ability selection, patterns of skill formation, and frictions in post-college labor markets. I develop an equilibrium labor market search model with two-sided multidimensional heterogeneity and endogenous college and major decisions. In my model, individuals are initially sorted into college majors based on their multidimensional abilities (math, verbal, and social) and preferences. These decisions lead to differential human capital accumulation across all ability dimensions. I use data from the NLSY79 and O*NET to calibrate the model, which I then use to evaluate the effects of subsidies targeted at specific college majors. My findings indicate that Science and Engineering and Business and Economics majors demonstrate limited responsiveness to subsidies compared to Humanities and Social Sciences majors. This is because Humanities and Social Sciences majors tend to attract individuals who might otherwise opt out of college. The expenditure-neutral, welfare-maximizing subsidy scheme, which allows for differential subsidies based on college major while maintaining fixed total subsidy costs, leads to a 0.5% increase in overall welfare. This policy also results in a 35% increase in the number of Science and Engineering graduates.