I study the macroeconomic implications of college major choices in the context of a frictional labor market framework. I develop an equilibrium search model with two-sided multidimensional heterogeneity in the labor market and endogenous college and major decisions. In the model, individuals are initially sorted into college majors based on their multidimensional abilities (math, verbal, and social) and preferences, which leads to differential human capital accumulation by major across these dimensions. Firms are heterogeneous in their job requirements and create jobs endogenously. I calibrate the model using data from the NLSY79 and O*NET. I use the model to evaluate the role of college subsidies in mitigating inefficiencies arising from labor market frictions. The expenditure-neutral, welfare-maximizing subsidy scheme—which allows for differential subsidies across majors while maintaining fixed total subsidy costs—leads to a 0.5% increase in overall welfare. This policy also results in a 35% increase in the number of Science and Engineering graduates. General equilibrium effects are significant, with about one-third of output gains in the welfare-maximizing economy driven by improved job creation and reduced worker-job mismatch. These findings stand in contrast with the current practice, where higher education subsidies are largely distributed without differentiating by college major.